|
April 16-17, 2004
|
|
|
April 16-17, 2004
|
Marcello Antosh
Remarkable and Unremarkable Worlds
New York University (New York, NY)
In this paper I compare two explanations of why reality is the way it is. One explanation is provided by a view Derek Parfit outlines in his article, “The Puzzle of Reality: Why does the Universe Exist?” On this view, which I more fully examine under the name ‘the selector principle’, some special feature (selector) of this reality might enter into the explanation for why this reality exists. I compare this view with the theistic view, which is based on the idea that a god is responsible for the whole of reality. In discussing each I encounter two problems that affect how each view can most plausibly explain the whole of reality. The result is that both views produce strikingly similar explanations of why reality is the way it is. Though the selector principle is a variant of modal realism and the theistic view involves a creative agent, I argue that the most plausible accounts of both views demand similar ontologies. In at least one respect the two views differ, however, since the theistic view does become slightly more puzzling when attempting to account for our reality if it so happens that it is not a particularly remarkable one.
Nathan Ballantyne
A Defense of Nozick’s “Experience Machine”
University of Toronto (Toronto, CANADA)
Psychological hedonism is the thesis that the only ultimate desires we have are to attain pleasure and to avoid pain. Is this thesis true? Are we psychological hedonists? In Anarchy, State and Utopia , Robert Nozick constructs a thought-experiment meant to refute psychological hedonism. In this paper, I outline both Nozick’s thought-experiment and an objection to it recently offered by Elliott Sober. I then argue that Sober’s objection fails.
Andrew Blaine
Plato’s Theaetetus: A Lesson in Philosophy
SUNY Potsdam (Potsdam, NY)
My paper argues that Plato’s “Theaetetus” should be read heuristically, rather than as laying down a philosophical doctrine. Supports for this view are taken mainly from the translation by M.J. Levitt and commentary by Burnyeat. Although Burnyeat does not hold quite the same position as I do, I have found some elements that coincide with my argument. The bulk of my supports are derived from the dialogue itself based on the conversation between the young mathematician Theaetetus and the old Socrates. References are made to other works, but they are few.
The “Theaetetus” ought to be viewed as a lesson to all of us on how to do philosophy, and how to live our lives, which are one and the same to Socrates. Perseverance for the truth should drive us, and we should not be discouraged when we are found to be wrong. How one does philosophy is much more important than coming up with definite answers.
Mario Andres Blanco
Christiano and Hobbes: On the Same Side After All
Cornell University (Ithaca, NY)
In Hobbes’ theory, rational, self-interested individuals in pre-political societies leave the undesirable State of Nature and form a state in which they authorize a Sovereign to govern them. This state is considered by Hobbes to be the most justified and legitimate state for all individuals. Christiano argues that Hobbes’ theory is incoherent because the justified state, L, is not always the state that rational, self-interested individuals in an actual society should act to bring about. This is because, in an actual society, challenging the status quo often brings harm to the acting individual.
I hold that Christiano’s argument is flawed because he has incorrectly interpreted Hobbes’ theory. I argue that, in Hobbes’ theory, individuals who are not in the ideal state should not necessarily act to bring about the ideal state. While the attempted movement from the State of Nature to L is a low risk endeavor, the attempted movement against the status quo of an existent society is a high risk endeavor; a Hobbesian individual (i.e. rational and self-interested) should never put herself in danger unless she absolutely has to.
Daniel Bristol (1999 alumnus)
Messages From the Bottom: Reflections on Life's School of War
SUNY Oneonta (Oneonta, NY)
Life, I am told, is a journey, not a goal. For me, it has thus far been a struggle of self-development not unlike the rigors of a military academy. It is my hope that I will make my meaning clear, and perhaps you will gain something from what I am about to share with you. I do not intend to delve deeply into the ethereal world of intellectual bliss. I intend to be very sparing with matters of theory and give you a glimpse into my own gut-level struggle. It has been bliss, but what you may not realize is that bliss can come from pain as much as it can from joy. What is more important is what we gain during the journey, whether it is from the mountaintop or from the bottom.
Tamar Christmas
Similarities Between Confucius and Aristotle
Morgan State University (Baltimore, MD)
Aristotle and Confucius are from completely different lands, yet in spite of this, both were able to guide many people onto virtuous paths. Though their teachings vary in certain aspects, they provided their followers with surprisingly similar ethical guidelines. Both of the philosophers’ works suggest how one should act in order to live a good life, and although that goal is not the same for Aristotle and Confucius, both views express a suitable character, which is present throughout their readings. In their quest to improve one’s ethics, Confucius and Aristotle share a few basic ideals on how life should be treated. I will particularly discuss their views of precision, the balance of virtues, the characteristic of “virtue,” the ideal good, and the best life, all of which are similar themes throughout the works of Confucius and Aristotle.
Sean Cummings
Animal Liberation: A Critique of Singer’s Argument
SUNY Oneonta (Oneonta, NY)
At first glance, the words "animal liberation" may seem a bit extreme. If animals are in need of liberation, to what do they owe their bondage? When most people hear the word "liberation” only a certain number of situations are considered: slavery prior to the civil war, perhaps the civil rights movement of the nineteen-sixties, or maybe women’s suffrage, all of which constitute the oppression of human beings and all of which, when first met with the idea of liberation, seemed just as extreme. Perhaps the idea of animals being liberated seems so absurd, so over the edge of reasonable moral pursuits, because some believe that animals are not beings worthy of the freedom to live a certain way, or of having certain rights. Humans are free; animals are meat, instruments for our dietary and experimental needs: this is the common view. However, this view is highly vulnerable to an attack by the principle of equality, the same principle which helped to abolish racism and sexism. In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer argues that ending animal suffering, through vegetarianism dominantly but also through other means, is a practice in utility: a greater good for a greater amount of beings that could serve to benefit humans as well. These principles are the basis for Singer's argument. However, the effects of Singer’s argument may not show themselves as utilitarian, and an exploration of proper amendments is needed.
Joshua Duclos
Freedom and Foreknowledge: Redescribing Divine Omniscience
Connecticut College (New London, CT)
This paper reexamines the traditional responses to the problem of divine omniscience and human freedom, and, through a series of examples and arguments, shows both the compatibilist and incompatibilist positions to be inadequate. I begin by presenting and defending a pragmatic postulate that is a necessary precursor to any discussion of free will. I then consider what implications this postulate has for the problem of divine omniscience. Ultimately, I argue that the supposed “paradox” of divine omniscience and human freedom has more to do with a lexical misunderstanding of divine omniscience than with the logical inconsistency of concepts. Just as Kierkegaard redescribed divine omnipotence to be the ultimate ability to set beings free, I redescribe divine omniscience to be the absolute knowledge of good and evil, that is, infallible moral knowledge rather than factual knowledge. By conceiving of divine omniscience as absolute moral knowledge I attempt to eliminate the “paradox” of omniscience and free will. In addition, I submit that this description of divine omniscience provides an attribute that actually seems worthy of a necessarily perfect being.
Jeffrey Engelhardt
Persistence and Language in Heraclitus’ ‘Psuche’
Saint Peter’s College (Jersey City, NJ)
This paper considers the relationship between persistence and language in Heraclitus’ fragments. In parts I – III, I describe and examine J.M. Moravcsik’s interpretation of Heraclitean flux in his article “Appearance and Reality in Heraclitus’ Philosophy.” In parts IV and V, I attempt to show that expanding Moravcsik’s interpretation renders it compatible with Martha C. Nussbaum’s analysis of the soul in her article, “ψυχή (psuche) in Heraclitus, I.” I focus on fragments (12), (91), and (49a) in the discussion of Moravcsik, and fragment (3) for Nussbaum. Out of my discussion of Moravcsik and Nussbaum, I conclude that persistence for Heraclitus may be true only in language and that realizing this facilitates an understanding of the universe.
Cesar Estela
The Causal Connection in Knowledge: Alvin Goldman’s “A Causal Theory of Knowing”
Seton Hall University (South Orange, NJ)
In this paper, I will begin by establishing the traditional account of knowledge, otherwise known as Justified True Belief (JTB) or the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge (TAK). Next, I will present Edmund Gettier’s counter-examples as a way of demonstrating the necessity to reconsider the JTB approach due to the weakness in the justificatory conditions of this account. Subsequently, in light of Goldman’s theory, Gettier-type counter-examples are excluded. But the objections raised against the causal theory reinforce the need for verifiability in the causal processes. Perceptual knowledge cannot be allowed absolute certainty. Even if the chain were to be made as strong as possible, there would still be the possibility of a fallacy in committing to the wrong cause as the source for a belief. Nonetheless, I do not wish to advance a causal theory of knowledge. As an alternative, I hope to show that Alvin Goldman’s causal theory of knowledge is a clever replacement of the justification conditions in the JTB account. Also, the causal connection should be considered as an extraneous and sufficient property of the justificatory condition that relates it with belief.
Peter Faben
Wither Determinism?: Marx and the Philosophy of Internal Relations
SUNY Cortland (Cortland, NY)
Economic determinism has long been attributed to the philosophy of Karl Marx. His materialist conception of history has often been read as an assertion that the economic base of society is the primary factor in engendering social change and superstructural phenomena. This reading of Marx was for many years the official doctrine of the COMITERN and as a result, non-orthodox Marxist scholarship has suffered. This paper is an attempt to cast off the specter of determinism with a reading of Marx first proposed by Bertell Ollman. By revealing Marx’s unusual use of words and radically different approach to social ontology, Ollman demonstrates that a determinist reading of Marx is not only unattractive, but also highly tenuous. Instead, a reading of Marx’s materialist conception of history which incorporates the Hegelian notion of “expression” is proposed as a more useful theoretical approach.
Ted Fox
Zhuangzi, Kierkegaard and Evolutionary Psychology
Belmont University (Nashville, TN)
In their book, The Sense of Antirationalism, Karen L. Carr and Phillip J. Ivanhoe map out what they consider a philosophical disposition they call antirationalism, and which they believe to be championed by Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard. Although the similarities they find between the two thinkers are stunning, there also comes into view a significant disparity that is left unaddressed. The dissimilarity to which I refer lies in the philosophers’ views of human nature. In this paper, I will first describe what Ivanhoe and Carr mean by antirationalism and how this is manifested in Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard. During the course of my exposition, I will show how antirationalism as found in these two thinkers is directly tied to their views on human nature. Then, I will introduce the recent work by Steven Pinker on human nature into the conversation with Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard offering several clarifications and corrections of each based on Pinker’s account of modern evolutionary psychology.
Laura Gillespie
Transcending the Individual: Moral Responsibility and the Interconnected Self
Simmons College (Boston, MA)
Libertarian or determinist, compatibilist or incompatibilist, the notion of a unified self—in various accounts free or determined, socially constituted or the author of itself—informs both the language and the logic of the discussing of free will and moral responsibility. What I mean to assert in this paper is three-fold: first, that a determined self—as feminist, biological and post-structuralist theorists have often asserted—is a socially constituted self; second, that if a self is socially constituted then it is without morally relevant boundaries between self and other; and, third, that moral responsibility has no principled basis without such boundaries.
Nick Kasatkin
Hick’s “Irenaean Theodicy”, A Theistic Account of Evil At Last?
Georgia State University (Atlanta, GA)
The problem of evil is a simple yet effective question poised to challenge the theistic conception of God: “Why does God allow for evil to exist?” Many brilliant minds have offered their solutions, but ultimately none are yet to succeed within a theistic framework. Some, like Augustine, have suggested that the existence of evil is explained by the Fall of Adam and Eve. Other, more modern thinkers, like John Hick, suggest the evil is accounted for in the name of the greater good. But is that really the case? Has Hick finally been able to solve the greatest of problems to traditional theism? I believe that Hick’s solution, as suggested in “Irenaean Theodicy”, is ultimately a failure. Within this paper I will challenge Hick’s main thesis that natural evil is a necessity for the development of the humankind towards the finite perfect image of God.
Matthew Landis
Towards a Hermeneutics of Gender
Richard Stockton College of NJ (Pomona, NJ)
My paper is an attempt at a historical/cultural examination of two distinct sub-groups: the 19th century dandy and glam/punk rock in the 1960/70’s. I attempt to examine the art, intellectuals, and personalities of these two distinct eras and sub-cultures through a distinct methodological framework: that of Gadamerian hermeneutics. The foundation for my examination of these groups is based on a Gadamerian reading of Plato’s Symposium. The fundamental thrust of the paper is that hermeneutics, if Gadamer is correct in surmising that life is lived “hermeneutically” in it’s authentic form, provides for us a dialogical understanding of sex and gender which arises out of a more generalizable and challenging ethical demand from Plato’s text: that our relationship with the Other must always be a dialogue which allows the Other to disclose their own beauty while remaining Other—in other words, finding beauty in the Other on their own terms. In applying this premise I propose a way of approaching the current issue of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bi, and transgendered rights) with a focus on the rights of transsexual, transgendered, and even intersexed individuals.
Jennifer Lunsford
Afraid of the Dark: Nagel and Rationalizing the Fear of Death
Hartwick College (Oneonta, NY)
Thomas Nagel, in his article “Death”, sets out to examine what it is about death that a person finds so objectionable. He briefly discusses the idea that the fear of death is rooted in one’s inability to understand what it is “like” to be dead. This Nagel quickly dismisses, arguing that it is logically impossible to imagine oneself dead, and those that fear death because of this logical impossibility are merely misunderstanding the concept of death. I contend that it is this very logical impossibility which makes death something worthy of fear. Truly understanding the logical impossibility of the task only heightens the fear associated with death, because an inability to comprehend something makes it all the more elusive and mysterious, and unknown, mysterious things are the most feared things of all.
Heather Mills
Jackson and Nagel on Consciousness
Wheaton College (Norton, MA)
In this paper I argue the role of consciousness from essays by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson. In his analogy from What Mary Didn’t Know Jackson misinterprets Nagel’s argument concerning the species-specific nature of consciousness. He also neglects to hold physicalism accountable for its inability to explain the mental event of imagining. While science can explain the physical events of the brain, Jackson’s retraction in Postscript on Qualia too easily abandons the ineffable nature of consciousness. Neuroscience is able to explain much of the physical aspect of the brain and what happens in the brain when Mary, in Jackson’s essay, sees red for the first time. However, there is an aspect of experiential knowledge that language cannot capture and Nagel’s argument supports this claim. Consequently, physicalism cannot be true.
Andrew Moon
Time, Divine Eternity, and the Problem of Creation
Ohio State University (Columbus, OH)
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to find a coherent view of God, time and creation. In the first section, I will present an outline of the two major theories of time and provide two definitions of eternity. In the second section, I will argue that time is finite and had a beginning. In the third section, I will explore whether a coherent model of God, time, and creation exists. In the end, I will conclude that none of the discussed models are successful and that a solution must be found elsewhere.
Jeffrey Myers
Hacking as a Focal Practice in the World of Disposable Devices
Rochester Institute of Technology (Rochester, NY)
Albert Borgmann characterizes our modern relationship with technological Devices as the “device paradigm,” in which we value efficiency and commodity functions over challenge and engagement. This leads to a self-fulfilling, distracted and petty lifestyle. I propose that the practice of hacking—exploring, modifying and adapting the functionality of technical devices—should be encouraged as a worthy focal practice that functions within the constraints of this dominant technological paradigm.
This paper explores Borgmann’s definitions of the device paradigm and focal practices, and explains how hacking meets the criteria he uses to identify a focal practice. Once established as a focal practice, I describe ways the practice of hacking can be fostered by changing the way devices are designed, and by promoting the development of hacking skills in children.
Matthew J. Roberts
Testing the Human Limits: Nietzsche, Genealogy and the Necessity for Self-Overcoming
DePaul University (Chicago, IL)
What inherent qualities or predispositions make the task of genealogical investigation so appealing to those who heed its call? I will begin this paper by questioning and rethinking the very meaning of genealogy in order to confront what is at stake in genealogical investigation. I will argue that what is at stake in the genealogical discourse or investigation is a self-reflexive experiment that is constituted by the genealogy. As such, this experiment pushes the thinker towards his or her limits in order to affirm the necessity for destroying such limits. Secondly, I will investigate Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals in order to provide an exemplar of this genealogical experiment. I will argue that Nietzsche participates in affirming the self-reflexive experiment constituted by the genealogy as he affirms the necessity for self-overcoming. As such, the genealogy constitutes the recoiling movement of the text, and in affirming the stake of genealogical investigation, Nietzsche participates in overcoming the ascetic qualities that constitute his discourse.
Christopher Demuth Rodkey (1999 conference alumnus)
Is Community Possible in Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein’s Phenomenology of Empathy?
Drew University (Madison, NJ)
This essay asks whether community is possible in the phenomenological thought of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross). Concentrating on the two thinkers’ related conceptions of the idea of empathy, I will conclude that since empathy is the conduit through which feeling may occur between individuals and groups, empathy must be postulated as the foundation for genuine community. I will further comment upon the religious or quasi-religious nature of empathically-based communities.
Anthony C. Russo
Dreaming and Knowing
Salisbury University (Salisbury, MD)
In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism Barry Stroud defends the skeptical denial that knowledge can be had by systematically refuting the attempts of various philosophers to produce a proof of either knowledge or the external world. The success of his argument is contingent on the proposition that since I cannot know that I have ever been awake, I can know nothing (I shall refer to this as “the dream objection”).
In this paper I shall explore whether the assertion that I may be dreaming has any effect on my claim to knowledge. I will show that both the necessities attached to sentience and the reflexivity of reason allow us to make true judgments about such things as logic, mathematics, and morality whether or not we are dreaming. By impugning the assertion that there is a stark difference between wakefulness and sleep it can be shown that reason can overcome conflicting and/or ambiguous data, including dream data.
Jacob W. Skinner
Nietzsche and Adorno’s Identity Thinking
University of New Hampshire (Durham, NH)
The experience of reading Nietzsche is not something that can be easily expressed in, say, a formal essay or conversation between friends. His work emphasizes the importance of breaking from the cultural norms and questioning the way we live our lives, while at the same time his philosophy is an example of it. Nietzsche challenged his audience to think on their own, for the world he loved was as a place rich in differences, contradictions, interpretations, and perspectives. In fact what I find most interesting about reading Nietzsche is the way he sticks out as a precursor for so many of the great philosophical ideas that have ensued. He is a father to modern thought because of his ability to describe just enough of the human situation to make the general idea(s) relevant to all his audience, though never overly detailed in observation so as to loose the point over the course of time and change. As he put it best, "Wisdom sets bounds even to knowledge."
Like Nietzsche, Theodore W. Adorno’s philosophical mode of criticism stands in opposition to his surrounding world and culture. In their individual ways they each reject the modern forms of rationality and enlightenment, while emphasizing the importance of rescuing thought from narrow-minded norms. This essay makes a case for Nietzsche’s influence over the problem Adorno most fundamentally struggled with: identity thinking. By giving a brief introduction to Adorno and following with a comparison between several similarities that ground Adorno and Nietzsche’s work together, I will make a case for the relevancy of Nietzsche’s work in light of the more contemporary and modern stance taken by Adorno.
Ryan Stohlman
The Relationship of Philosophy and Theology in the Works of Thomas Aquinas
Marymount University (Arlington, VA)
This paper investigates the relationship of philosophy and theology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The examination of Aquinas’ works is limited to his Summa Theologica, his Summa Contra Gentiles , and his Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate. Aristotle’s understanding of scientia from the Posterior Analytics, which Aquinas adopted, is explained and applied to Aquinas’ approach to the study of philosophy and theology. The synthesis of philosophy and theology, and faith and reason, in Aquinas’ work will be evaluated. Aquinas’ defense of the autonomy of philosophy and the other secular sciences is examined. The autonomy of philosophy is reconciled with Aquinas’ understanding of philosophy as the handmaiden of theology. The ways that Aquinas thought philosophy aids theology and theology assists philosophy are discussed. While many medieval thinkers saw philosophy, particularly Aristotelian philosophy, as a threat to Christianity, Aquinas justified the use of philosophy within theology and harmonized the Aristotelian method with the faith. This paper concludes that Aquinas depicted philosophy and theology as complementary subjects, which are dependent on each other to accomplish their respective goals.
Josephe Michael Vincent
Emotions: Expression, Responsibility & Self-Control
Is the Choice to Ascent to Emotion also a Choice to Express Emotion?
University of Hawaii (Honolulu, HI)
The aim of this paper is to identify emotions as communication devices that relay cognitive desires and choices, to illustrate how emotions necessarily require social contexts, and to recognize an essential connection between the emotional components of expression and responsibility. It is conceded that certain aspects of emotion require choice, but choice is not the defining factor. The conventional emotional structure (Impulse→Choice→Emotion) is expanded to include components of non-impulse constructed feelings and internal urges. Human emotions are then identified both as social communication devices and as actions reflecting one’s cognitive coping mechanisms. Therefore, people are very capable of controlling their emotions. As identified in the teachings of Confucius, “How we consciously regard others simply cannot be divorced from how we treat them.” A question resulting from this inquiry is: Is the cognitive choice to ascend into emotion also a choice to physically express emotion?
Website constructed and maintained by Douglas Shrader / Department Chair Philosc@Oneonta.edu 
April 13, 2004
