Abstracts
Christopher Arroyo
The Philosophy of Psychology and
the Metaphysics of Persons
Saint John's University (Jamaica, NY)
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I demonstrate that psychology should be considered a science. I do this by using criteria supplied by philosophers of science, namely Thomas Kuhn’s definition of paradigm and Karl Popper's criterion of falsifiability. Second, I point out the main difference between psychology as a social science and the natural sciences is one of degree, not method. This becomes manifest in psychology's inability to formulate behavioral laws. This is not due to a shortcoming on the part of psychologists, but rather, it is metaphysically impossible. What I mean by this is that due to the radical freedom of human persons, it is impossible to establish laws of behavior. The third and final task of this paper is to show how a psychological theory is grounded in its metaphysical view of person, lay the groundwork for a metaphysics of person which takes into account our freedom, and insist that any meaningful psychological theory must have this metaphysics as its foundation.
Brett Bisgrove
The Freedom That Fear Hath Wroth
SUNY Oneonta (Oneonta, NY)
It is important to note that this is an excerpt from a larger body of work written over a period of a year. The reflections and arguments are the author's own, or rather products of an analytic process. I have submitted this segment of work because of its exploration of the critical foundation of social equality. The genesis of a social equality through common covenant within political philosophy is indeed a pressing and viable topic. Herein lies the turning point; this is the break between what work has been done thus far and all work that shall be done next. The work done prior has been a synopsis and analysis of some of the major themes of applicable philosophical thought in context of history. Now the time has come to set aside these works from the focal point that they have enjoyed thus far, and move on to a more personal manifestation of philosophy. It is with the utmost respect and care that I must now attempt to craft a personal work that shall include the pressing issues identified by those noble thinkers.
Daniel Bristol
The Nature of Mind In Tibetan Buddhist
Ethical Theory
SUNY Oneonta (Oneonta, NY)
The Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths represents an engaging synthesis of ethics and psychology, with implicit treatment of the Buddhist theory concerning the nature of mind. The ethical system of Tibetan Buddhism is not essentially different from that of any other school of Buddhism. As we shall see, although Tibetan Buddhism connects a metaphysical theory of reincarnation and different realms of existence to its ethical theory, the roots of this system lie in a kind of noetic science, where the first aim is to understand the nature of mind. This is because all actions are held to begin as impulses originating in the mind.
Iain Tucker Brown
A Buddhist Analysis of the Structure
and Function of Causality
in Martin Buber’s
I-It and I-Thou Spheres of Relation
St. Mary’s College of Maryland (St. Mary’s City,
Md.)
The twofold manner in which man disposes himself toward beings encountered in the world, and accordingly the relation causality maintains upon man’s bimodal dispositions, refers to the “I-It,” and the “I-Thou” spheres of relation that Martin Buber intends. His prescriptive approach for relinquishing the effect of suffering, which causality encumbers upon man, is rooted in the mode of disposition which man contends toward these beings. This relinquishing effect, where the sway of causality is not felt or made aware, is a “freedom from,” and as such is constituted by man’s disposition of relating to beings encountered in the world in the “I-Thou” form. With an interpretation of Martin Buber’s understanding of man’s disposition toward beings in the world in the “I-It” form, and as well with the assistance of a Buddhist interpretation and deconstruction of causality, it is my assertion that causality is fundamentally non-existent. In which case causality will also be illuminated as an entity solely based upon man’s disposition toward beings encountered in the world in the “I-It” form. By examining man’s relation in the “I-It” sphere, it will also be seen how man comes to suffer. This will consequently give light to the meaning underlying Martin Buber’s “I-Thou” sphere of relation. In either “subordination to” or in “freedom from,” man has the ability to determine and to choose the affect causality bears upon him.
Katherine Collins
Buddha, Kant, and the Ethical Consequences
of Suicide
University of Massachusetts Lowell (Lowell, MA)
This paper compares the moral theory of Immanuel Kant with that of Buddhism. On the surface these two theories may appear to be radically different from one another. Although I do not maintain that these theories are identical, I do contend that there are some interesting parallels. I will illustrate these parallels by examining the issue of suicide and the individual's responsibility to his body. Both philosophies approach suicide in a similar manner, i.e. emphasizing the intentions of the potential suicide. These ethical systems are also similar in the role they assign to desire and moral deliberation. They differ, however, in the analysis of what is desire and why it is bad. This paper outlines Buddhist and Kantian ethics generally, examines suicide in particular, and discusses the similarities and differences.
Nathan C. Doty
Intuitions in Conceptual Shape?
: Misconceptions and Motivations
Haverford College (Haverford, PA)
McDowell's project in Mind and World is to remove analytic philosophy from an untenable situation. Philosophy has found itself in "an interminable oscillation" between two unacceptable views each motivated by a corresponding fear: Coherentism and the Myth of the Given. Coherentism, embodied most clearly by Donald Davidson, is the view that the only thing that can justify a belief or judgment is another belief. Consequently the world can have no rational impact on the beliefs that we come to have. This theory comes out of the realization that only the conceptual can count as a reason for thought: "if we conceive experience in terms of impacts on sensibility that occur outside the space of concepts, we must not think we can appeal to experience to justify judgments or beliefs" (M&W 14). This brings into question whether thought and judgments are about the world at all. Davidson only provides the world with a merely causal relation to belief. In that case an appeal to the world can never serve as a reason for belief and "therefore ... cannot genuinely make room for empirical content at all" (M&W 46).
Robert Erlewine
An Attack on Tradition
St. Mary's College (St. Mary's
City, MD)
In this paper I examine Heidegger’s conception of the Self in light of traditional (Cartesian) understanding. This paper examines first the traditional conception of the Self in terms of its interactions with others and objects. Then, this paper presents Heidegger’s conception of Self, using the traditional conception as its foil. Finally, this paper considers two problems with Heidegger’s conception of Self which are not present, or at least as problematic, in the traditional conception.
Matthew A. Ferkany
An Analysis of Deontic Logic and
Chisholm's Paradox
Oakland University (Rochester, MI)
Among the few paradoxes of standard logic is included Roderick Chisholm's contrary-to-duty paradox, where an imperative is prescribed designed to inform moral agents what they ought to do should they fail to fulfill other obligations. This contrary-to-duty prescription results in seemingly contradictory obligations for the agent. In this paper it is argued that the obligations of Chisholm's reasoning contain a notion not formalized in standard deontic logic, yet that is essential to contrary-to-duty reasoning, namely context sensitivity, and the lack of which is the source of the troublesome contradiction. The sentence operators and deductive apparatus of deontic logic are modified to formalize the appropriate aspects of context. A formal presentation of the new language is given, and Chisholm's reasoning reconsidered and shown to be a valid argument in the new language. Finally, some objections are considered.
Timothy Gilmore
Epictetus' Stoicism
SUNY New Paltz (New Paltz, NY)
The Stoicism of Epictetus, as it survives today, is expounded in the form of brief moralistic preachings. In this paper I attempt to delineate and explicate the major themes of the Stoic worldview that lie beneath Epictetus' practical advice. The themes dealt with are determinism, the problem of freedom, and the sage. Discussion begins with the Stoic conception of determinism. The notion of pre-determined harmony is replaced by a determinism that allows for the presence of evil. The problem of the limits of human freedom within this determined cosmos is then examined. In coming to an explication of freedom recourse is made to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger for aid in clarification and to show that Stoic ideas persist to this day as echoes and influences. The prescriptions for sagehood are then examined along with the detriments to its realization. The validity of the Stoic conception of human possibility is asserted.
Robert I. Haley
How and Why We Should Defend Society
from Science
Canisus College (Buffalo, NY)
In our scientifically obsessed society it is often very difficult to think of anything negative about science. It is even harder to question science and its authority. We live in a world where science is like an emperor and everyone is afraid (or too ignorant) to stand up and say that the emperor has no clothes on. Paul Feyerabend is one of the few modern secular philosophers to stand up and say that the emperor is naked. In this case science is caught without any clothes, and it is during this time that we can see the true nature of science in all of its glory and opprobrium. Feyerabend associates this society's blind obsession to science to the Middle Age's obsession to religion. He explains, how and more importantly why society should be defended from science. This paper will attempt to organize and explain Feyerabend’s thoughts and ideas.
Tara Hogan
Justice Outside the Polis in Aristotle's
Politics and Nicomachean Ethics
Mary Washington College (Fredericksburg, VA)
In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, what binds together the polis is justice. Aristotle places justice inside the domain of the polis. Interpreters such as Alasdair MacIntyre have even asserted that justice has no existence apart from the polis. This paper presents several passages and definitions in Nicomachean Ethics and Politics which seem to allow for a broader conception of justice in Aristotle's philosophy than simply the one existing in the ideal polis. Aristotle's understanding of justice as a virtue directed towards others provides a larger sense of the possibility for justice than simply the one occurring in a political state. The narrow and rare standard of justice, the one existing in the ideal polis, seems to make other “analogous” justices, which make up the majority of cases, more genuine forms of justice. Given these factors, this paper presents a charitable reconstruction of Aristotle's account of justice which emphasizes justice in relationship not governed by a polis.
Phil Jenkins
Objectivity and Evolution in Ethics
Hunter College (New York, NY)
In ethics there is a tendency to look for objective truths. Common sense seems to tell us that some things are good and others bad. Kant thought that ethical questions could be solved objectively by using rational thought, and Aristotle thought his ethical findings were grounded in objective ideas open to ‘practical reason’. But are our moral evaluations really grounded in objectivity or is it somehow just the nature of ethics to appear so? In this paper we will examine the possibility that the objectivity in ethics is illusory. Once we have determined this, we will move on to explore the idea that humans have developed the tendency to think that all ethical convictions come from an objective source because the ruthless trial and error of evolution has ‘taught’ us the success of such a strategy.
David Manley
Freedom, Responsibility, and Derived
Natures: A Critique of Compatibilism
Boston College (Chestnut Hill, MA)
The analogy of robots suggests a powerful intuition of the principle that responsibility for actions transfers to prior causes if those actions can sufficiently be explained in terms of determinism. However, an analogy to other possible beings (such as God), shows that in principle compatibilist freedom -- the ability to act according to desires but not to act otherwise -- can ground moral responsibility. The significant distinction between the two types of possible determined entities (God and robots) concerns being derived, or created. In order for the transfer principle to apply to an entity, that entity must be determined by its nature and also have a wholly derived nature. Compatibilist freedom is not a quality sufficient for moral responsibility in entities that have derived natures. Various other qualities considered sufficient for responsibility along with compatibilist freedom are considered, drawing upon the book Elbow Room as a model account for compatibilism.
Christopher Martin
Heidegger, Lao tzu and Dasein
Mary Washington College (Fredericksburg,
VA)
Heidegger considers the experience of potential authentic being to be disclosed
in the mood (attunement) of angst (anxiety). Taoist and Ch’an philosophies
consider the experience of authentic being enlightenment and disclose it
necessarily in the mood of bliss. Why is the same moment experienced
in one tradition disclosed in angst while another experiences it as bliss?
Embedded in a reply to this question lie two
goals:
1) To explain Heidegger’s understanding of everyday
Dasein, specifically what it means for Dasein to experience potential
authentic being and how this differs from everydayness, and
2) To explain how the philosophies of Taoism
and Ch’an understand enlightenment as authentic self-nature.
Two conclusions may then be drawn:
1) Heidegger presents an ontology which applies
to all Dasein such that the experience of potential authentic being is
wholly unprepared for by any one individual Dasein, which is counter to
the training and active pursuit of the Taoist or Ch’an monk, and
2) Heidegger’s ontology is descriptive, Taoist
and Ch’an philosophies are prescriptive.
Lastly, if accepted thus far, it becomes clear that as prescriptive philosophies,
Taoism and Ch’an have applicable suggestions regarding the modern idea
of the self as expressed in Heidegger’s Being and Time.
Brian Mello, Colleen McClain, and
Mike Franz
Science, Technology, and Man's
Project to be God
Fairfield University (Fairfield, CT)
Distinctive to existential philosophy is the notion that life is an incremental project. According to Jean-Paul Sartre, that project is man’s desire to be God. Our thesis is that the uses of science and technology in American society support/affirm Sartre’s views concerning the nature of man. Indeed, we identify with an unconscious desire in man to appropriate the qualities that the Judeo-Christian world attributes to God. Particularly, Western thought envisions an immortal God as a transcendent being that can control nature and has created man in His own image. As such, we posit that the use of science and technology in society today demonstrates man’s desire to take on the aforementioned Western qualities of God. Specifically, we will examine four points that support the veracity of Sartre’s claim. It is important to point out, however, that this desire is not necessarily a universal one but only a project that can be attempted by those who are in a position to utilize the scientific and technological benefits of modern society. We conclude by agreeing with Sartre’s eventual assertion that this project is necessarily absurd.
Jonathan C. Messinger
Contextual Influences on
Wittgenstein's Philosophy
Clark University (Worcester, PA)
This paper deals with Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's first book, The Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. It attempts to demonstrate how it is that a book whose consequential role in language philosophy was established immediately upon its printing. The origin of the paper not only lies in Wittgenstein's much written upon early encounters with the Cambridge analytic philosopher Bertrand Russell, but also is inclusive of the rich Viennese culture in which he grew up. It is the thesis of the paper that while Wittgenstein was trying to solve the problems presented by Russell; he was equally struggling with the same problems with language that his Viennese contemporaries faced. In the end, the paper shows that Wittgenstein uses adaptations and corrections of Russell's method and logic to reconcile the Viennese literati's dilemmas.
Aaron Meyer
Constructing a Framework Over Reality:
A Relativistic
View of Reality and Human Awareness
SUNY Rockland Community College (Suffern, NY)
In this paper, the subject matter is human awareness and the nature of reality itself. In it, a framework is erected in order to provide a different viewpoint on the world. Reality is first postulated as being relative to the self; in the end the previous definition is relegated to the status of a perspective on reality, while "reality" becomes the keyword for an objective entity that exists totally independent from human thought and comprehension, similar to the Tao. As well, human awareness is broken down into an equation of variables, though an unsolvable equation, at least numerically. The self is expressed by a series of variable representations of factors, such as the emotions and the subconscious. The concept of the subconscious is utilized here, as being part of a collective unconscious, which affects all of humanity and how we perceive reality. Finally, the paper deals with different levels of reality, and attempts to postulate a totally objective reality, and how it interacts with us ourselves, and our subjectivity. Other topics that are touched upon are Hume's theory of knowledge and Descartes initial question as to whether we really even exist or not, as well as references to the Tao and the collective unconscious. However, this paper is not an analysis of any thinker or school of thought, and is not intended to be. It is an attempt to analyze reality itself from a new (and perhaps unique) mode of thought. It was written without consulting textbooks or any other works, apart from remembered themes. It is wholly an original work.
Christopher Rodkey
Nietzschean Christology
Saint Vincent College (Latrobe, PA)
Friedrich Nietzsche had very different opinions concerning the man known to history as Jesus Christ and his legacy, the religion called Christianity. As a well-known philosopher of contemporary times, Nietzsche's reputation with Christianity is severely ambiguous, as a result of a "long customary" association with the NAZI Party of Germany, which, as one critic points out, is "like linking St. Francis with the Inquisition in which the order he founded played a major role." Still, despite much misunderstanding and prejudice, Nietzsche's influence on the world remains consistently strong, as "few thinkers of any age equal his influence." Nietzsche's philosophy is rooted in his own interpretation of the life of Jesus of Nazareth and the history of Christianity, as he considered himself the first philosopher of the "irrevocable anti-Christian era" from which all Christian and secular systems associated with Christianity would henceforth bow. Nietzsche, however, does not see this new era in the history of the world as essentially negative; he believes that he is the first of 'the new way,' and "things will be different," positively. Further, one must understand Nietzsche's position on Jesus and Christianity, the most crucial part of his philosophical system, as separate issues, to completely appreciate and comprehend the rest.
Melvin L. Rogers
The Anatomy of Liberalism
Amherst College (Amherst, MA)
In this essay I offer a philosophical and historical reconstruction of the development of liberalism through several important thinkers, namely, Hobbes, Locke, Mill, Kant, and Rawls. I place this reconstruction against the background of that tradition that liberalism is often defined in contrast to, namely, the Ancient tradition as represented by Aristotle. As I highlight, the liberal picture of politics takes citizens’ freedom to be primarily defined by negative rights held against other citizens. Liberalism affirms the self-sufficiency of individuals whose obligation to belong to society is seen to be merely conditional inasmuch as it is for their mutual advantage. But the development of self is not contingent on this obligation to society. This is most apparent, as I argue, in liberalism’s elevation of the private over the public, the identification of freedom with the pursuit of private interest, and the central feature of the sovereign individual. But this picture of liberalism, I contend, is first generated by Hobbes’ desire to secure a safe haven for the individual, and subsequent approaches to satisfying that desire. In the conclusion of this essay, I suggest my picture of liberalism is part of a far more larger and complicated story, and that there are a number of other thinkers who mediate and problematize my reconstruction.
M. Drummond Royal
A Critique of David B. Annis' Contextualist
Theory of Epistemic Justification
Wheaton College (Wheaton, IL)
In an important essay for contemporary epistemology, David B. Annis has advanced a naturalized, contextualist theory of epistemic justification that accounts for the social component of justification, he says, while solving the main problems of coherentist and foundationalist theories. Annis' contexutalism proposes an alternative conception of "basic beliefs." His basic beliefs are those beliefs whose basicallity is a function, not of their independent justification (as in foundationalist theories), but of their status as unquestioned in a given community context.
My critique of Annis' theory is that, ironically, it turns out to be too stringent. As counter examples I provide paradigmatic cases of knowledge which, nevertheless, would be considered epistemically unjustified by Annis' criteria. I then attempt to strengthen Annis' theory against my own criticism, but show finally that the theory fails because these attempts inevitably drive the justifying mechanism away from the community-context, the center of Annis' theory.
M. Drummond Royal
On the Question of Questioning
the Christian Faith: A Hermeneutic Paradox
Wheaton College (Wheaton, IL)
As children of the Enlightenment and citizens of a secularized world, some Christians come to realize that their intellectual posture toward the Christian religion is largely one of questioning rather than confidence. The modern, introspective Christian lives with the inherited responsibility of "owning" her faith and with the perpetual possibility of entertaining the question, "Is Christianity True?"
What does it mean phenomenologically to ask a question? Is this question, "Is Christianity True?" somehow different than others? With helpful insights from Heidegger and Gadamer, I try to show that for the Christian, this question is fundamentally different than others. Even though it seems impossible not to ask this question, asking it involves the Christian in a basic paradox. Furthermore, contrary to the trends of much of contemporary Christian literature, this paradox may lend support to the more "fundamentalist" assumption that it is not OK for the Christian to ask, "Is Christianity true?"
.
David J. Schummer
William Alston on Epistemology and Religion
State University of New York at Buffalo (Buffalo, NY)
In the anthology titled, God and the Philosophers, William Alston states, "although philosophical reasoning has very important roles to play in the religious life, producing faith is not one of them." The aim of this paper is to show that although philosophical reasoning may not be necessary to produce faith, for a philosopher such as Alston, it is necessary to justify and sustain such faith. I intend to show this by discussing the degree to which Alston's justification of his Philosophical Theology relies on his Reformed epistemology. Furthermore, if Reformed epistemology can stand on its own, then to what degree does it really support Alston's Philosophical Theology?
Priyadarshi Shukla
Hegel And Shankaracharya: On the
Non-Dualistic “I”
LeMoyne College (Syracuse, NY)
In this paper I am going to explore the problem with dualistic Self in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in comparison to Advaita Vedanta of Shankaracharya. The problem of dualism has been haunting human civilization since its very “genesis.” The most common example of dualism is the aeon old battle between good and evil. For centuries there has been a strong discrimination between good and evil; humans in search for the Absolute have always tried to move from one extreme to the other—from evil to good and vice versa. Sometimes fearing that an error may happen in their quest, which will lead them to their downfall, humans have abstained themselves from attaining any kind of knowledge. This game of extremes has always dominated the human quest for the Absolute; some are aware of it and some are not, nevertheless, those who have realized the relativism of the extremes, i.e., one extreme cannot exist without the other have searched the middle way, or the way of union, i.e., non-duality.